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TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFI' TRUSTS-DEVIATION FROM TRUST TERMS ON THE 
BASIS OF UNFORESEEN EMOTIONAL EMERGENCIES-Plaintiff and her son were 
the principal beneficiaries of a testamentary spendthrift trust which had 
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been created by plaintiff's husband. The son, Montgomery Ward Thorne, 
was found dead under unusual circumstances. His will left a portion of 
his interest in the trust to his fiancee and her mother. A contest over the 
son's will developed between plaintiff and the designated beneficiaries in 
the will which caused intense bitterness between the parties. A compromise 
agreement was entered into, and plaintiff brought suit to obtain (1) court 
approval of the will contest settlement -and (2) a direction to defendant 
trustee to invade the corpus of the spendthrift trust to provide funds for 
the settlement. The chancellor approved the settlement and directed de-
fendant trustee to invade the corpus. On appeal, held, affirmed. The 
chancellor had authority to deviate from the trust terms on the basis of an 
emotional emergency engendered by the son's death and the subsequent 
dispute between plaintiff and her son's beneficiaries. The existence of 
spendthrift provisions did not prevent deviation. Thorne v. Continental 
Ill. Nat. Bank b Trust Co., (Ill. App. 1958) 151 N.E. (2d) 398. 
The general rule is that spendthrift trusts cannot be terminated even 
though all the beneficiaries consent,1 and that the terms of the trust must 
be followed.2 The reason for the rule is that the purpose of such a trust is 
to insure its beneficial enjoyment, which can best be accomplished by 
securing it from the beneficiaries' own improvidence3 as well as by shielding 
it from the claims of creditors.4 Courts have recognized exceptions to this 
rule where exigencies develop which were unforeseen by the settlor, and 
deviation from the terms of a spendthrift trust is allowed on the basis of 
what the settlor would have intended had he anticipated the circumstances.5 
Generally, cases applying this exception have involved either economic 
emergencies which threaten substantial or complete deterioration of the 
trust corpus,6 or impossibility to comply literally with the trust provisions.7 
1 Harrison's Estate, 322 Pa. 532, 185 A. 766 (1936). See 123 A.L.R. 1438 (1939). 
2 Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50 N.E. 337 (1898). 
3 See Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 91 N.E. 66 (1910). 
4 See Perabo v. Gallagher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922). 
5 See Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 at 230 (1862). See also ScoTT, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §337 
(1956), for a discussion of termination and modification of trusts; Scott, "Deviations from 
the Terms of a Trust," 44 HARV. L. \REV. 1025 (1931). 
6 In re Minden's Will, 138 N.Y.S. (2d) 340 (1954), where the court allowed the sale 
of the real property held in trust because of a substantial reduction in net income and 
changed character of the community. See also Matter of Pressprich, 124 Misc. 15, 207 
N.Y.S. 412 (1924), where the court allowed a sale of the securities constituting the trust 
when they became highly speculative. 
7 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S.W. (2d) 556 (1949). The 
court allowed a different investment from the one specified in the trust as none could 
be found to yield the required rate. See also Donnelly v. Nat. Bank of Wash., 27 Wash. 
(2d) 622, 179 P. (2d) 333 (1947), where the court allowed the beneficiary to use the proceeds 
of the trust for the purpose specified despite failure literally to comply because World 
War II made literal compliance impossible. However, as stated in Rogers v. English, 130 
Conn. 332, 33 A. (2d) 540 (1943), mere "difficulty" to comply will not be a basis for 
deviation from the trust terms. 
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The court in the principal case based its decision on the "emotional" 
emergency confronting the plaintiff, believing that such an emergency 
could be far more devastating than a financial emergency. The court 
reasoned that the dominant purpose of the settlor was the welfare of the 
plaintiff and her son, and this would be best effectuated by allowing a part 
of the corpus to be used to settle the compromise. Use of the unforeseen 
emergency doctrine as a basis for deviation has been substantially extended 
by the court in two distinct ways: (l) it is interpreted to include the 
beneficiary's "emotional," as opposed to financial emergencies; (2) it is 
applied to an emergency which in no way affects the trust corpus. The 
principal case appears to hold that if a trust beneficiary becomes involved 
in a sufficiently unpleasant situation which money can cure, the chancellor 
may in his discretion order the trustee to invade the corpus if he finds the 
beneficiary's interest is best served thereby. Adoption of such a position 
appears to run at cross currents with a basic purpose of a spendthrift trust, 
which is to provide an income from a relatively stable fund which cannot 
be tampered with except where emergencies threaten the fund itself. It 
is questionable, therefore, whether the action of the court conforms with 
the settlor's intent, since "emotional emergencies" might be just the sort 
of improvidence from which the settlor attempted to protect his beneficiary. 
Another basis for terminating or deviating from the terms of a spend-
thrift trust which is recognized in many courts is a will compromise agree-
ment.8 The court in the instant case, by way of an additional justification 
for its decision, stated that there is "some analogy" between this case and 
those involving such agreements.9 In the will compromise cases, however, 
including those relied on by the court in the principal case, the controversy 
was over the will which established the trust10 while in the instant case the 
controversy involved the subsequent will of a trust beneficiary. The signifi-
cance of this difference is brought out by the view of the New York courts, 
which deny that a testamentary trust is being altered or terminated by a 
will compromise since the trust does not attain legal existence until final 
8 Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fitzpatrick, 256 Mass. 125, 152 N.E. 328 (1926), 
which allowed a will compromise to terminate a spendthrift trust; Madden v. Shallen-
berger, 121 Ohio St. 401, 169 N.E. 450 (1929), which allowed a will compromise to deviate 
from the trust terms. See also, l\fass Laws Ann. (1955) c. 204, §§13-17; R.I. Gen. Laws 
(1956) tit. 33, c. 7, §17, which deal with allowing will compromise agreements. Contra: 
Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat. Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931), where the court 
did not allow a will compromise to terminate a spendthrift trust; Stein v. LaSalle Nat. 
Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3, 65 N.E. (2d) 216 (1946), where the court did not allow a will 
compromise to deviate from the trust provisions. See also note, 31 MICH. L. REv. 268 
(1932) for a discussion of the Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat. Bank case. 
9 Principal case at 404. 
10 E.g., Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fitzpatrick, note 8 supra; N.Y. Life Ins. and 
Trust Co. v. Conkling, 159 App. Div. 337, 144 N.Y.S. 638 (1913); Altemeier v. Harris, 403 
Ill. 345, 86 N.E. (2d) 229 (1949); Tree v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 346 
Ill. App. 509, 105 N.E. (2d) 324 (1952). Both of the Illinois cases were cited by the court 
in the principal case. 
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adjudication of the will.11 It is often difficult to determine whether this 
theory is accepted by other jurisdictions since it is usually not considered,12 
but those that do so would be unlikely to grant relief in the principal 
case since the New York decisions clearly indicate that the court cannot 
affect a previously created trust on the theory of a will compromise. The 
use of the will compromise as a basis for the result in the principal case 
would appear to be a clear extension of the theory. Thus whether this 
decision is based on the doctrine of unforeseen emergency or will compro-
mise, or a combination of both, it appears to represent a substantial de-
parture from traditional views. Nonetheless, the case illustrates the ap-
parent wisdom of leaving the doctrine sufficiently flexible to permit relief in 
the highly unusual circumstances which gave rise to this litigation. 
Robert ]. Paley 
11 See Matter of O'Keefe, 167 Misc. 148, 3 N .Y.S. (2d) 739 (1938), involving a will 
contest settlement where the court held that statutory restraints against alienation of a 
trust did not apply until after the will creating the trust is probated. 
12 See Madden v. Shallenberger, note 8 supra, where a will compromise allowed 
modification of a spendthrift trust; Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fitzpatrick, note 8 
supra, where a will compromise allowed termination of a spendthrift trust. In neither 
case was the New York theory discussed. See also Bohannon v. Trotman, 214 N.C. 706, 
200 S.E. 852 (1939). Several years after a will establishing a trust had been probated, a 
will compromise was allowed and the trustee used part of the trust corpus to effectuate 
the settlement. This would seem inconsistent with the New York view expounded in 
Matter of O'Keefe, note 11 supra, as it would be difficult to deny the existence of a trust 
which had been operating since probate of the original will, and this case might have 
gone the opposite way in the New York court. For the Illinois view, see Wolf v. Uhlemann, 
325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927), where the court allowed a will contest settlement to 
alter the terms of a testamentary trust without mention of the New York theory. But 
see Altemeier v. Harris, note IO supra, which said by way of dictum that a testamentary 
spendthrift trust could not be terminated by a will compromise. In the principal case, 
the court said they were not terminating the spendthrift trust. But it is at least arguable 
that there was termination as to a portion of the spendthrift trust, for which the court 
cited no authority under the will compromise theory. 
